Australian â€˜Bikieâ€™ Laws in the Absence of an Express Bill of Rights by Gray, A. (Anthony)
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2009)  
274 
 
Australian ‘Bikie’ Laws in the Absence of an Express Bill of Rights 
Anthony Gray 
Associate Professor of Law 
 University of Southern Queensland 
Anthony.Gray@usq.edu.au 
Abstract. Two Australian States have recently introduced legislation allowing a member of 
the Executive to declare an organisation, if it believes its activities pose a danger to the public.  The 
effect of this declaration is that a court must make a control order against members of the 
organisation, which has the effect that one member of the organisation cannot associate with other 
members.  Jail terms are provided for breach of such orders.  An association need not be notified 
that the Executive is considering declaring them, and may or may not make submissions before the 
member of the Executive makes the declaration.  While no doubt a politically popular response to 
perceived problems with some motorcycle gangs, there are very serious civil liberties’ concerns with 
such legislation.  It is difficult to challenge such laws in Australia given the lack of an express bill of 
rights, but it is argued the High Court of Australia could rely on suggestions of a right to due process 
implicit in the Constitution to invalidate such laws.  Further, the laws undermine the principle of 
separation of powers by, in effect, directing a court as to how to exercise its discretion.  Further, it is 
argued the laws interfere with the right to freedom of association. 
I. Introduction 
 
In this article, I discuss the so-called ‘bikie’ legislation introduced already in some Australian states and suggested 
in others.  I will use this convenient name for the legislation,1 though the Acts do not name ‘bikie’ or ‘bikie gangs’ 
as being the object or target of the legislation.  In discussing the supposed need for such legislation, politicians 
often use the ‘problem’ of bikie gangs as a reason for such legislation, although as has been commented upon 
elsewhere, the perception of the connection between gangs and crime is often false.2  Legislation has already been 
passed in South Australia (SA) and New South Wales (NSW); it is being canvassed in other States.  Here I will 
focus largely on the South Australian model of legislation (and explain its New South Wales counterpart, where 
there are important differences), and consider the constitutionality of such legislation, given its impact on 
fundamental human rights.  This discussion takes place in a context where Australia is one of the few western 
nations without an express Bill of Rights,3 and has not enacted the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights into legislation. 
 
2.  Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) 
 
Section 8 of the Act allows the Commissioner of Police to apply to the Attorney-General for a declaration.  The 
application must be in writing, identify the organisation the subject of the request, set out the supporting 
information for the application, and details of any previous application.  Once the Attorney receives the 
application, they must publicly advertise that the application has been made, and invite members of the public to 
comment on it.4  There is no requirement to give the organisation the subject of the request a specific notice of the 
application. 
 
2.1 When a Declaration can be made 
 
If the Attorney-General thinks members of the organisation associate for the purposes of organising or planning 
serious criminal activity (we will call this a ‘criminal purpose’), and the organisation represents a risk to public 
                                                          
1
 This is the media’s preferred form of reference for these laws. 
2
 As Thomas Barker and Kelly Human recently put it, ‘deviant clubs have always represented a small percentage of the 
motorcycle riding public but they receive the most attention and publicity’:  ‘Crimes of the Big Four Motorcycle Gangs’ (2009) 
37 Journal of Criminal Justice 174; Louis Holland ‘Can Gang Recruitment Be Stopped? An Analysis of the Social and Legal 
Factors Affecting Anti-Gang Legislation?’ (1995) 21 Journal of Contemporary Law 259, 263. 
3
 There is currently a review of the extent to which human rights are adequately protected in Australia.  Two regional 
jurisdictions, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, have introduced human rights legislation. 
4
 Section 9. 
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safety and order in the State, they may make a declaration about the organisation.  Serious criminal activity mostly 
means indictable offences.  In considering whether or not to make the declaration, relevant factors are: 
(a) information suggesting a link between the organisation and serious criminal activity; 
(b) criminal convictions recorded against current or former members of the organisation, or those who associate, 
or have associated, with members of the organisation; 
(c) information suggesting that current or former members of the organisation, or those who associate, or have 
associated, with such members, have been or are involved in serious criminal activity (directly or indirectly, and 
regardless of whether the conduct has resulted in any criminal convictions); 
(d) information suggesting members of an interstate or overseas chapter or branch of the organisation associate to 
organise or plan serious criminal activity; 
(e) public submissions on the matter; and 
(f) other relevant matter.5 
 
It doesn’t matter whether all or only some members of the association associate for the criminal purpose, 
provided those that do form a ‘significant group within the organisation’ either in terms of numbers or influence.  
It doesn’t matter whether they associate for other non-criminal purposes as well.  It doesn’t matter whether the 
association for the criminal purpose relates to the same serious criminal activities or different ones.6  If the 
Attorney-General makes a declaration, they are not required to provide reasons7. 
 
2.2 The Effect of the Declaration 
 
The making of a declaration affects members of the declared organisation or associates of members. 
(i) how it affects members 
 
Section 14 of the South Australian legislation provides that the Court must, on application by the Commissioner, 
make a control order against a defendant if they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that they are a member 
of the declared organisation.  It is not necessary to give notice to any person before a control order is made.8  If the 
defendant is a member of a declared organisation, the order must prohibit the defendant from associating with 
others who are members of declared organisations, and possessing dangerous articles or prohibited weapons. 
 
(ii) how it affects current non-members 
 
The court may also make an order against a person (a) who has been a member, (b) who has engaged in or engages 
in serious criminal activity and regularly associates with members of the declared organisation, or (c) the 
defendant has engaged in serious criminal activity and regularly associates with others who do the same. 
The control order may prohibit the defendant from associating or communicating with certain persons of a 
certain class, enter or be near the specified premises or those of a specified class (e.g. premises belonging to a 
‘bikie’ group), or from having specified articles or those of a particular class (e.g. weapons).9  Relevant factors 
include whether the defendant’s behaviour, or history of behaviour, suggests that they will engage in serious 
criminal activity, whether the order might stop the defendant engaging in serious criminal activity, the defendant’s 
prior record and that of any of their associates named in the application, any legitimate reason the defendant might 
have for associating with a person specified in the application, and other relevant matters.10 
                                                          
5
 This list is very similar to the list of factors that an ‘eligible judge’ hearing such an application in New South Wales may 
consider in making the application to have an organisation declared under the Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 
2009 (NSW)(s9(2)).  A key difference between the New South Wales law and the South Australian law is that the application 
to have the organisation declared in New South Wales takes place before a judge, while in South Australia the order is made by 
a member of the Executive.  The New South Wales legislation also provides for notice of the application to be given to the 
members of the organisation subject to the application, allowing them to make submissions to the eligible judge (subject to the 
provisions about ‘criminal intelligence’. 
6
 Section 10(4). 
7
 Section 13(1). 
8
 Section 14(3).  The New South Wales law also provides that a control order application can be heard against a person in their 
absence (s19 (4)). 
9
 Section 14(5); the equivalent provision in New South Wales is s26(1) which provides that a controlled member of a declared 
organisation who associates with another controlled member of the declared organisation is guilty of an offence. 
10
 Section 14(7) provides that upon making a control order, ancillary orders may be made, including one for the confiscation 
and disposal of a particular article, or authorising a police search of premises on which such an article is suspected to be 
located. 
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A control order must be directed at the person specified in the application, set out the terms of the order, 
including a statement of reasons, and set out rights of objection.11   However, information that meets the definition 
of ‘criminal intelligence’ must not be disclosed in giving reasons, as I discuss below.  The order must be served on 
the person personally.12  The person can appeal the making of the order to a magistrate who might confirm, vary or 
revoke the order.13  The magistrate’s decision can be further appealed to the Supreme Court.14  It is an offence to 
not comply with a control order, with a maximum five year jail term.  It is a defence if the person did not know 
that they were contravening the control order as long as they were not reckless.15 
Section 27 of the New South Wales Act provides a further consequence of the making of a control order in 
relation to a person; that any authorisation they possess to carry on a ‘prescribed activity’ is automatically 
suspended until the interim or control order is revoked.  The person cannot apply for permission to conduct a 
‘prescribed activity’ while the order is in place.  The section provides examples of prescribed activities including 
work in the security industry, carry on a pawnbroker business, work as a commercial agent, operate a tow truck 
business, sell motor vehicles, work as a mechanic and sell liquor, or work in the racing industry. 
 
2.3 Disclosure of Certain Types of Evidence – Criminal Intelligence 
 
Section 21 of the South Australian law (with similar provisions in s28 of the New South Wales Act) provides that 
no information provided by the Commissioner to a court for these proceedings may be disclosed to any person 
(other than the Attorney-General or the court), if the information is ‘criminal intelligence’.  This is defined in s3 as 
information relating to actual or suspected criminal activity (in the State or elsewhere) where disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to prejudice criminal investigations, enable the discovery of the existence or identity of a 
confidential source of information relevant to law enforcement, or to endanger a person’s life or physical safety. 
 
2.4 Public Safety Orders 
 
Section 23 of the South Australian law allows a senior police officer to make a public safety order if they believe 
that the presence of the person, or persons of that class, at any premises or event, or within an area, poses a serious 
risk to public safety and security.  Relevant factors include whether persons of that class have previously behaved 
in a way that poses serious risk to public safety or security or have a history of engaging in serious criminal 
activity, and whether they are or have been members of a declared organisation, subject to control orders or 
associated with such people.  If the reason for the gathering if to conduct a protest, dissent or strike, the public 
interest in maintaining freedom to participate in such activities must be considered.  It is also relevant to consider 
the risk involved in allowing the individuals to be there, whether they have legitimate reasons for doing so, 
whether other measures are available to manage the risk, and to what extent the order will mitigate the risk. 
Any order made must contain reasons, unless they relate to ‘criminal intelligence’ as already defined.  The 
maximum period of a public safety order is 72 hours. 
 
2.5 Criminal Associations 
 
Section 35 of the South Australian law provides that a person who associates at least six times during a period of 
12 months with a person who is a member of a declared organisation or the subject of a control order is guilty of 
an offence.  The maximum penalty is five years’ jail.  The person accused must know the other person is a 
member of a declared organisation or the subject of a control order, or be reckless about that fact.  It is also a 
crime for a person with certain criminal convictions to associate at least six times within a year with another such 
person.  The maximum penalty is again five years’ imprisonment. 
 
3. Some Issues with This Legislation 
 
These laws have stirred great controversy.  Recently, Brisbane barrister Mark Le Grand discussed them in The 
Australian.  Le Grand, a lawyer experienced in the field of law enforcement and fighting organised crime, 
described the New South Wales laws thus: 
This legislation represents the most complete abrogation of the citizen’s right to a fair trial that I have 
witnessed in four decades of practice.16 
                                                          
11
 Section 15. 
12
 Section 15. 
13
 Section 18.  In New South Wales, the appeal is to the Court of Appeal (s24). 
14
 Section 19. 
15
 Section 22. 
16
 P23, The Australian April 25-26, 2009. 
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I will now discuss three specific areas of concern – infringement of a right to a fair trial, breach of the 
principles of separation of powers, and infringement of the right to freedom of association. 
 
3.1   Infringement of a Right to a Fair Trial/Right to Due Process 
 
Two specific aspects of the South Australian regime will be considered in suggesting that the law infringes the 
right to a fair trial/right to due process– the use of ‘criminal intelligence’ in relation to the application, and the fact 
that the organisation may know of the proceedings against it until after a control order has been made.  In spite of 
the absence of an express bill of rights or express inclusion of the right in the Constitution, the High Court of 
Australia has (arguably) accepted that the concept of due process is part of Australia’s constitutional 
arrangements.17  In Bass, Gleeson CJ Gaudron McHugh Gummow Hayne and Callinan JJ agreed that judicial 
power involved proceedings conducted in accordance with the judicial process, requiring the application of the law 
to facts as found, and that parties be given an opportunity to present their evidence and to challenge the evidence 
led against them.  Of course, due process can mean different things to different people, but as Wheeler has noted, 
the judges have tended to express the concept in terms of fairness and impartiality.18  The requirement of natural 
justice has been noted in this context.19  It seems that this requirement is not confined to federal courts.20 
 
(a) criminal intelligence 
Both laws provide for the concept of ‘criminal intelligence’; the definition matters because any evidence within its 
meaning, in the case of the South Australian law, cannot be disclosed to the accused or their legal representative, 
and in the case of the New South Wales law, steps are to be taken to maintain the confidentiality of such 
information, steps which might include receiving evidence and hearing argument in private (i.e. without the 
accused and their legal representative).  This means, of course, that a control order may be made, with serious 
consequences, against a person without their having the opportunity to see or test the evidence being used against 
them. 
In other contexts, this has been objectionable.  For example, in Nicholas v The Queen,21 Gaudron J set out 
what was necessary for the due process in a Chapter III court to be maintained.22  (Of course, State Courts are not 
Chapter III courts, but the principle of separation of powers can be drawn down from the Commonwealth 
Constitution to state courts, at least those with federal jurisdiction).23  Her Honour stated: 
 
Consistency with the essential nature of a court and with the nature of judicial power 
necessitates that a court not be required or authorised to proceed in a manner that does not 
ensure equality before the law, impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, the right of a 
party to meet the case made against him or her, the independent determination of the matter in 
controversy by application of the law to facts determined in accordance with the rules and 
procedures which truly permit the facts to be ascertained, and in the case of criminal 
proceedings, the determination of guilt or innocence by means of a fair trial according to law.24 
 
                                                          
17
 Bass v Permanent Trustee (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359; Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173; Fiona Wheeler ‘Due 
Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High Court’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205; ‘’The Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 
248; Janet Hope ‘A Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial? Implications for the Reform of the Australian Criminal Justice System’ 
(1996) 24 Federal Law Review 173.  In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 355 Gummow and Crennan JJ claimed High 
Court decisions did not establish a right to due process flowing from Chapter III, but agreed that legislation requiring a court to 
depart significantly from the methods and standards that have characterised judicial activities in the past may be offensive to 
Chapter III. 
18
 Ibid; Gaudron J in Re Nolan; Ex Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 496 spoke of the judicial process as ‘protect(ing) the 
individual from arbitrary punishment and the arbitrary abrogation of rights by ensuring that punishment is not inflicted and 
rights are not interfered with other than in consequence of the fair and impartial application of the relevant law to facts which 
have been properly ascertained’. 
19
 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ Dawson and McHugh JJ).  A good working definition of 
natural justice is provided in the judgment of Mason J in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 582: ‘it is a fundamental rule of the 
common law doctrine of natural justice expressed in traditional terms that, generally speaking, when an order is to be made 
which will deprive a person of some right or interest in the legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case 
sought to be made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it’. 
20
 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363 (Gaudron J) and 373 (Kirby J). 
21
 (1998) 193 CLR 173. 
22
 Chapter III of the Australian Constitution provides for the establishment of the federal judiciary. 
23
 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
24
 208-209. 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2009)  
278 
 
It is submitted that the application of the criminal intelligence exception discussed above can, in practice, 
mean that a person might not have the right to ‘meet the case made against him or her’, considered by Gaudron J 
to be fundamental.  Gaudron J also saw it as essential that a process be adopted whereby the facts must be 
ascertained – traditionally, this occurs through sometimes robust cross-examination, an avenue again denied to a 
person in respect of evidence said to be ‘criminal intelligence’ in these cases.  In Dietrich,25 members of the High 
Court discussed the requirement of a fair trial, including that an accused be properly prepared for trial26 and that 
evidence be discarded if its weight and credibility cannot be effectively tested.27  A current member of the High 
Court concludes, in relation to cross-examination, that  
 
No evidence given by one party affecting another party in the same litigation can be made 
admissible against the other party, unless there is a right to cross-examine.28 
 
The right of a person to meet a case against them is also specified in international documents, including 
Article 14(3) (d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the right of an accused to be tried in 
their presence), Article 14(3) (e), and the right to examine witnesses called against them.  Article 6(3) (a) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights requires that an accused by informed promptly and in detail of the nature 
and cause of a case against them; be given adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, and to have the right 
to examine witnesses.  In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court of the United States re-asserted the right of an 
accused terrorist to be given notice of the factual basis for his classification as an enemy combatant, and a fair 
chance to rebut the government’s assertions.  The Court emphasised the right of the accused to challenge the 
government’s case:29 
Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed 
correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short … 
An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property must be preceded by notice 
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.30 
In order to exercise their right to be heard, and in order to enjoy that right, they had to be notified of the 
application.  The right to notice and an opportunity to be heard had to be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.31  Neither in the South Australian legislation nor the New South Wales legislation is there a 
requirement that an association about whom an application for a control order is to be made be given specific 
notice. 
Judgments in the majority in Thomas v Mowbray acknowledge in dicta the importance of the right of an 
accused to make full arguments, departure from which might be justified only on grounds of national security, and 
even in the context of terrorism offences some judges have expressed at least some ambivalence towards a lack of 
cross-examination on evidence.32  In dissent, Kirby J would have invalidated the provisions challenged in that 
case; his reasons included that ‘the individual subject to an application or order may not be informed of particular 
evidence raised in the case against them’.33 
This legislation, allowing a court to hear and interpret evidence in relation to a person, without the 
involvement of that person and/or their representative, is similar to other legislation that has been challenged.  For 
example, in considering legislation that provided for an application for a restraining order in relation to property, 
                                                          
25
 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 311 (Mason CJ and McHugh J), Brennan J 323, Deane J 326, Toohey J 353 and 
Gaudron J 362. 
26
 Deane J, 335. 
27
 Gaudron J, 363.  
28
 Cross on Evidence: Seventh Australian Edition (2004) 548. 
29
 (2004) 542 US 507; see also United States v Moussaoui (2004, Court of Appeals 4th Circuit). 
30
 Hamdi v Rumsfeld (2004) 542 US 507, 533, 537 (Rehnquist CJ, O’Connor Kennedy and Breyer JJ).  The reference to 
‘constitutionally short’ is a reference to due process, expressly guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
31
 533.  In the case of the South Australian legislation, arguably the notice provision is at the wrong time – a person’s right to 
challenge a control order comes AFTER it is made (s17), not prior.  They may not even be aware that an application has been 
made in relation to them.  The New South Wales legislation similarly does not require that particular members of the 
organisation, or the organisation itself, be given notice of the application – a newspaper advertisement and gazette notice are 
sufficient (s7).  However, s8 does provide for a member of the organisation to make submissions in respect of the application, 
before a decision is made. 
32
 (2007) 233 CLR 307, 358 (Gummow and Crennan JJ – ‘there may remain a question whether in the terms used in the 
Security Information Act the Parliament has sought to over-reach the bounds of the understanding of ‘national security’’; 335 
(Gleeson CJ – ‘we are not concerned in this case with particular issues as to procedural fairness that could arise where, for 
example, particular information is not made available to the subject of a control order or his or her lawyers’;  
33
 434. 
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without the presence of the person whose property it was, courts have not been impressed.  In the case of Re 
Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Qld), such legislation was struck down: 
The direction or command to the judge hearing the application to proceed in the absence of any 
party affected by the order to be made is such an interference with the exercise of the judicial 
process as to be repugnant to or incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth.  Then because the Supreme Court of Queensland is part of an integrated 
Australian judicial system for the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, such a 
provision is constitutionally invalid.34  
 
In the context of terrorism legislation, Ian Barker QC commented in strong terms on legislation allowing 
for the suppression of evidence used by the prosecution: 
The idea that information might be used by the prosecution without the accused seeing the 
information need only be stated for its offensiveness to basic notions of fairness and justice to be 
apparent.35 
 
This is what is possible given the definition of ‘criminal intelligence’ in both the South Australian and New 
South Wales ‘bikie’ legislation.  The South Australian legislation allows the Minister to make the declaration 
about an association without hearing the views of the association.36  The views of the association need not be taken 
into account.  It is not even necessary that the organisation be notified that the Attorney (in South Australia) is 
considering making a declaration in respect of them, or that the Court (in South Australia and New South Wales) 
is being asked to make a control order in respect of the association, based on the declaration. 
It is hard to see how such procedures are consistent with the requirements of natural justice.  As Mason J 
said in Kioa v West37 
It is a fundamental rule of the common law doctrine of natural justice expressed in traditional terms that, 
generally speaking, when an order is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or the 
legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case sought to be made against him and to be given 
an opportunity or replying to it. 
McHugh J in Kable denied that a State Parliament could validly legislate to permit a Supreme Court to 
disregard the rules of natural justice,38 yet this is what the current legislation authorises.  Clearly the rights of 
members of the association are going to be affected by the making of a control order in respect of their 
organisation, yet they may not know about the application. 
My conclusion here is that the South Australian legislation is offensive to due process because: 
 
(i) does involve a process in which the Executive’s factual assertions can go wholly unchallenged, in 
direct contradiction to the view of the United States Supreme Court as to due process; 
(ii) does breach the rules of natural justice by requiring the court to make the control order without 
having heard from representatives of the organisation affected.  Indeed they may not even know 
that the application has been made, because there is no requirement that the organisation affected 
be served with a specific notice; general advertising of the application in a newspaper and the 
gazette is sufficient.  This is contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s conception of the 
requirements of due process, a principle that has been accepted by the High Court of Australia. 
 
(b) Overreach of legislation at Minister’s behest 
 
Unlike the New South Wales model, the South Australian bikie laws directly involve a member of the Executive.  
The State Attorney-General is given the power, based on specified criteria, to make a declaration in relation to a 
particular group.  As Schloenhardt says, there is nothing to limit the legislation to organised crime; its operation is 
                                                          
34
 [2003] QCA 249, per Williams JA (with whom White and Wilson JJ agreed).  Williams J objected to the application of a 
‘public interest’ test when the person whose property was affected had no right to give submissions:  ‘how could a judge 
possibly be so satisfied in the exercise of judicial power when the only entity entitled to place material before the court on 
which a judgment on that issue could be formed was the State … asking a judge to make a decision on such issues … makes a 
mockery of the exercise of the judicial power in question.  The statutory provision removes the essential protection of the 
citizen inherent in the judicial process.  Effectively the provision directs the court to hear the matter in a manner, which ensures 
the outcome will be averse to the citizen and deprives the court of the capacity to act impartially’ [57]. 
35
 Ian Barker ‘Human Rights in an Age of Counter Terrorism’ (2005) 26 Australian Bar Review 267. 
36
 In contrast, the New South Wales legislation allows a member of an organisation specified in an application to be present and 
make submissions in relation to it (s8(1)). 
37
 (1985) 159 CLR 550, 582. 
38
 (1996) 189 CLR 51, 116. 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 4, Issue 4 (2009)  
280 
 
based on organisations that the Attorney considers to be risks to public safety and order.39  In contrast, the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, which criminalises participation in a criminal group, 
defines an organised criminal group as a structured group of three or more persons acting in concert with the aim 
of committing one or more serious crimes or offences.40 
 As we know, this declaration has serious consequences, in that a control order will then be made in relation 
to the group’s members, provided the Commissioner makes application.41  The Minister need not prove anything 
in order to make the declaration or in order to have a control order made.  It is suggested then that the legislation is 
overly broad and can possibly be applied to groups and organisations that have no link at all to public danger, but 
are the victims of a political witch-hunt or crusade.  The relevance of the fact that the legislation is considered 
overly broad is that, in any balancing exercise that might be required because the law is offensive to human rights, 
and allowing some deference to the legislature in terms of policy options to deal with important community issues, 
it is a relevant factor to be considered whether the legislation is proportional to the objects sought to be achieved, 
and/or whether it impacts on human rights to the minimal extent consistent with the achievement of its objectives, 
and/or whether other, less drastic options are available is also a relevant factor. 
We should bear in mind the wisdom expressed by Dixon J in the Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth.42  In that famous case, Dixon J pointed out that 
History … shows that in countries where democratic institutions have been unconstitutionally 
superseded, it has been done not seldom by those holding the executive power.43 
 
The Court in that case struck out as unconstitutional the provisions of the Communist Party Dissolution Act 
1950 (Cth).  The Act abolished the Australian Communist Party and ordered the seizure of its assets, and allowed 
the Governor-General to declare a particular association to be unlawful.  The criteria upon which the Governor 
General would make their decision were vaguely written.  It was an offence punishable by five years’ 
imprisonment to be a member of a declared organisation.  The property of a declared association would be seized 
by the government.  An individual could also be declared if the Governor General was satisfied that an individual 
was a communist or was engaged or likely to engage in activities prejudicial to Australian security.  Declared 
persons could not work for the Commonwealth or hold certain offices within some unions.  Judicial review of the 
Governor-General’s declarations was not available.  A majority of the Court declared that the law was invalid, as it 
was not being supported by a head of power.  The lack of specific criteria upon which the power would be 
exercised was problematic.   
Of course, these two factors are not in play here.  We are dealing with State legislation, so no question of a 
head of power arises.  Further, the Act does provide for specific criteria upon which the power is to be exercised.  
So, to this extent, the Australian Communist Party precedent is of limited assistance in resolving the issues here.44  
It is true also that in the early case of Lloyd v Wallach, the High Court validated legislation enabling the 
declaration of a Minister that a citizen was disloyal.  The effect of the declaration could be that person’s indefinite 
detention.  The court found it could not question the basis on which the Minister found their belief.45 
                                                          
39
 Andreas Schloenhardt ‘Mafias and Motorbikes: New Organised Crime Offences in Australia’ (2008) 19(3) Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 259, 277.  Moon suggests that organised crime legislation be based on the United States Racketeering 
Influenced Crime Organisations Act (RICO) and be limited to cases where there is a common criminal purpose bonding the 
individuals:  Michael Moon ‘Outlawing the Outlaws: Importing RICO’s Notion of Criminal Enterprise Into Canada to Combat 
Organised Crime’ (1999) 24 Queen’s Law Journal 451.  Indeed a comment made in the context of the federal anti-terrorism 
laws is also considered apposite in describing the South Australian bikie laws – Ricketts noted ‘there are virtually no 
safeguards against cynical political use of such powers by future regimes’:  Aidan Ricketts ‘Freedom of Association of Guilt by 
Association: Australia’s New Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Retreat of Political Liberty’ (2002) 6 Southern Cross University 
Law Review 133, 149.  At least with the federal terrorism laws providing for proscription of an organisation, parliamentary 
approval was required, a safeguard not apparent in the South Australian legislation here considered. 
40
 Article 2 of the Convention; see David Freedman ‘The New Law of Criminal Organizations in Canada’ (2006) 85 Canadian 
Bar Review 171.  I acknowledge that the bikie laws in Australia do not criminalise membership of a group, but they still carry 
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While the specific grounds upon which that legislation was held invalid are not available in the current 
case, there are other possible constitutional arguments available. These are discussed, in the context of the South 
Australian laws, elsewhere in this article.  But we should remember the Communist Party case as a previous 
instance where government attempts were made to effectively ban organisations, and the court stood firm against 
such manoeuvres and upheld the fundamental legal principles that remain to this day. 
 
3.2 Separation of Powers Arguments  
 
The South Australian legislation, in contrast to the New South Wales model, allows a Government Minister, the 
Attorney-General, to make a declaration about a particular organisation.  The effect of the declaration is that, once 
the Commissioner makes an application, the Court must, as long as it is satisfied that a defendant is a member, 
make a control order against the defendant.  It must prohibit the defendant from associating with others who are 
members of declared organisations, and from possessing dangerous articles or prohibited weapons. 
There is a risk that this regime impinges on the principle of separation of powers.  In Chu Kheng Lim v 
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs,46 a majority of the High Court invalidated a 
provision which stated that ‘a court is not to order the release from custody of a designated person’, on the basis 
that was an unacceptable infringement of the separation principle.  The majority declared the provision was a 
direction by the Parliament to the courts as to the manner in which they are to exercise their jurisdiction.  The 
majority drew a distinction between the granting or withholding of jurisdiction, which was acceptable, and the 
direction of a court as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of their jurisdiction, which was unacceptable.47  
Similarly, in Kable, a majority of the High Court struck out legislation which, in the words of McHugh J, made the 
court ‘an instrument of a legislative plan, initiated by the executive government’.  Such legislation undermined 
public confidence in the judiciary and was offensive to the integrated court system that the Constitution 
contemplated.48   
It is submitted that the South Australian legislation is challengeable on this basis.  The legislation directs 
the court to make a control order against anyone who is a member of a declared organisation.  It makes the court 
an instrument of a legislative plan initiated by the executive, offensive to majorities in Lim and Kable.  In the 
interesting recent case of Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner of Police,49 Kirby J 
invalidated legislation because, in his view, it involved a direction to the Supreme Court, ‘imposing the decision of 
an officer of the Executive Government upon the Supreme Court’.50  So, it is submitted, does this South Australian 
legislation. 
It might similarly be argued that the power being exercised by the Court in the South Australian legislation 
is not judicial in nature.  Though a definition of judicial power is notoriously difficult, it at least involves deciding 
controversies between subjects.51  In these applications, there is no controversy between subjects – the court must 
make the order in respect of a member of an organisation that has been declared.  For this reason, it is suggested 
that the court is not exercising judicial power, and this provides further support for an argument about separation 
of powers. 
One question might be whether it matters that the direction to make the control order is given to a 
magistrate rather a Supreme Court judge.  However, s39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) makes clear that all State 
courts can be invested with federal jurisdiction.  This was the key to the Kable decision – that while State 
Constitutions do not formally embody the principle of separation of powers, the Commonwealth Constitution 
does; that there was one integrated court system in Australia, so in effect the principle of separation of powers was 
drawn down from the federal level to the state level.  There is no suggestion in the reasoning in Kable that it would 
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not apply in the case of State magistrates.52  It is submitted the better view is that the drawing down would also 
apply to the level of a magistrate in a State magistrates’ court. 
While the granting of a power to a court to make a control order has been validated by the High Court, most 
recently in relation to preventive detention in Fardon,53 and in relation to the federal anti-terrorism law in Thomas 
v Mowbray,54 in Thomas the Court had discretion whether or not to make a control order, based on factors it would 
assess.  This contrasts sharply with the South Australian regime, which gives no discretion to a court to make a 
control order or not in relation to a member of an association, once the Attorney has made the declaration about 
the association.  There were also additional safeguards in place in relation to the power to declare terrorist 
organisations under the federal regime that do not appear in the bikie legislation.55 
 
3.3 Freedom of Association 
 
Given the lack of an express bill of rights in Australia, and no mention of a right to freedom of association 
expressed in the Constitution, it is interesting to debate the extent to which the right to freedom of association is 
protected in Australia. 
One mechanism is Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides 
expressly for the right to freedom of association with others.  The article provides that the right is not absolute, but 
that any limits must be prescribed by law and must be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.  A proportionality test is envisaged.56  The High Court of Australia has recently clarified that international 
law is relevant in interpreting the requirements of the Australian Constitution.57 
Presumably the argument of the South Australian Government would be that the bikie legislation is 
necessary to secure public safety and security.  However, when this justification has been given, courts have been 
sceptical and have required evidence from the enacting government rather than mere assertion.  For example, in 
Al-Nashif v Bulgaria, a case concerning the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights stated: 
Even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic 
society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial 
proceedings before an independent body competent to review the decisions for the decision and relevant evidence, 
if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information. 
The individual must be able to challenge the executive’s assertion that national security is at stake.  While 
the executive’s assessment of what poses a threat to national security will naturally be of significant weight, the 
independent authority must be able to react in cases where invoking that concept has no reasonable basis in the 
facts or reveals an interpretation of national security that is unlawful or contrary to common sense and arbitrary.58 
In contrast, the South Australian legislation does not allow an individual to challenge the finding of the 
Attorney that the national security or public safety is at stake.  There is a danger that the exercise of the power to 
declare will be arbitrary in nature. 
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As indicated above, the Australian Constitution does not contain an express guarantee of political 
association.  However, it has now been established that the Constitution contains an implied freedom of political 
communication, flowing from the system of representative democracy which it prescribes.  The implied freedom is 
not a source of positive rights but a freedom from interference by certain laws.  The Court has clarified that a two-
stage test is appropriate when laws are challenged on this basis, considering (a) whether the law effectively 
burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters in terms or effect; and (b) if so, whether 
the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner that is compatible with the 
maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the 
referendum process.  If the answer to the first question is yes and the second no, the law is invalid.59 
The question is whether the established freedom of political communication includes a freedom of political 
association.  In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth,60 Gaudron J claimed that representative 
democracy may include freedom of association, and McHugh J also discussed a right to associate.61  In Kruger v 
The Commonwealth,62 three judges agreed with a freedom of association.  Toohey J found it was an essential 
ingredient of political communication.63  Gaudron J agreed, to the extent necessary for the maintenance of the 
system of government for which the Constitution provides, as did McHugh J.64  Gaudron J noted that 
Just as communication would be impossible if each person was an island, it is also substantially impeded if 
citizens are held in enclaves, no matter how large the enclave or congenial its composition.  Freedom of political 
communication depends on human contact and entails at least a significant measure of freedom to associate with 
others.  And freedom of association necessarily entails freedom of movement.65 
In Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission,66 several members of the Court considered the argument 
in favour of a freedom of political association.  McHugh J reiterated his belief in such a freedom.67  Kirby J 
accepted there was implied in s7 and 24 of the Constitution a freedom of association and freedom to participate in  
community debate about their policies and programs and the substantially uncontrolled right of association 
enjoyed by electors to associate with political parties and communicate about such matters with other electors.68  
Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Heydon J agreed, did not dismiss freedom of association but appeared to 
confine it to a corollary of the freedom of political communication.69  Various commentators have suggested that 
freedom of association is essential to representative democracy.70 
On the assumption then that the freedom of political association is to be equated with the freedom of 
political communication, the Lange test can be adapted in this context as follows: (a) does the law effectively 
burden freedom of association in relation to government and political matters in terms or effect, and if so (b) is the 
law appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner compatible with the maintenance of the 
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the referendum process.   
I will now apply this two-stage test to the South Australian law.  Take first an extreme application of the 
legislation, where the Attorney declares the Opposition party under the Act.  The effect will be that the Court must 
make a control order against the members, including banning them from associating with other members.71  Most 
would suggest that the law would effectively burden freedom of association in relation to government and political 
matters – the answer to (a) above would be yes, and (b) the law is not appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate 
end compatible with representative and responsible government, since most believe that an effective Opposition is 
in fact vital to a decent system of representative and responsible democracy.  Government would not work very 
well if politicians were not effectively accountable to the people, because there was no Opposition, or if Ministers 
were not held accountable in Parliament, which would happen if there were no Opposition.  It is submitted that the 
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law, at least as applied in this way, should be struck out as being an unconstitutional interference with the freedom 
of political association essential to our democracy. 
Take a more ambiguous situation – a chamber of commerce group, whose primary aim is to boost business 
in a particular region, but also provides a forum for members to meet, at which time political issues (among many 
other issues) are discussed.  Current debates might include industrial relations reform;   or perhaps a trade union, 
whose primary aim is to lobby on behalf of its members and raise their grievances.  At some meetings of the 
union, issues such as existing law regarding occupational health and safety, wages, unfair dismissal and 
discrimination are discussed.  Say that the South Australian Attorney decides to ‘declare’ the chamber of 
commerce group or the trade union group, with the consequences that are by now familiar.  Again, it is suggested 
that the law would burden freedom of association in relation to government and political matters, and the question 
would need to be determined as to whether the law was appropriate to serve a legitimate end compatible with 
representative and responsible government required by the Constitution.   
It is anti-democratic not to allow individuals to meet together in groups where common concerns and 
grievances can be raised.  And it would be ridiculous, in my opinion, to hold that groups could meet, but their right 
to do so was confined to meetings, or at points during meetings, when they discussed what we define as ‘political 
issues’, but that as soon as they began to discuss things that did not fit the definition of ‘political issues’, their right 
to meet was no longer guaranteed and the government could legally prevent the meeting from occurring or 
continuing.   
Since a law is either constitutional or not constitutional, it is submitted that the South Australian legislation 
is offensive to the implied freedom of political association, since it does potentially burden that association in 
terms and effect, and it is not compatible with representative and responsible government.  It is simply not possible 
to draw a neatly divide meetings that involve ‘political speech’ and ones that don’t.72  Many meetings or 
associations will involve both kinds of speech.  Gaudron J recognised this difficulty in Kruger thus: 
 
Not every restriction on communication is a restriction on the communication of political ideas 
and information.  On the other hand, any abridgement of the right to move in society and to 
associate with one’s fellow citizens necessarily restricts the opportunity to obtain and impart 
information and ideas with respect to political matters.73 
 
So, at least for Gaudron J, it would not be necessary to prove that the organisation discussed political 
issues, or had a political objective.  It would be enough that the organisation provided the opportunity for citizens 
to meet, given the reality that when citizens meet, they often do talk about ‘political’ issues.  I would respectfully 
agree with the comments of Gaudron J in this regard.  Another commentator has called Gaudron J’s logic on this 
point ‘compelling’.74 
Given that the question whether there is a protected freedom of association in Australia has not been 
definitively answered, we are justified in considering the law of another nation where this issue has been more 
extensively litigated, including in the context of membership of bikie gangs.  The usual rider with such 
comparisons is again apposite – that the provisions differ and must be read in their context, and it should not be 
assumed that they mean the same thing or have the same scope.   
I concede that the freedom of political communication recognised in Australia is an implied freedom rather 
than an express one, while the cases I discuss below in relation to the United States have occurred in the context of 
an express First Amendment protection of freedom of speech.75  While the First Amendment right is a positive 
one, the High Court has found the implied freedom of political communication in Australia to be a negative one.  
While the Australian implied freedom has arisen in the context of ‘political speech’ due to its source in the 
constitutional requirement of representative democracy, the right as expressed in the First Amendment is not 
confined to ‘political’ speech, even if the inclusion of ‘and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances’ 
could be argued to give flavour to the intention of the drafters in guaranteeing free speech and free assembly.  The 
United States provision also expressly includes peaceful assembly and petition rights.76  However, in both cases 
the right is not absolute, and is subject to some kind of ‘reasonable regulation’/’compelling justification’ exception 
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that is familiar in rights discourse.  Bearing these differences in mind, it is submitted that the American 
jurisprudence in this area is helpful in addressing freedom of association in the context of the subject matter of this 
article, because some of the cases have directly considered First Amendment protections in the context of 
motorcycle gangs, as well as other groups.77 
The United States Supreme Court has referred to freedom of association in two senses; the choice to enter 
into and maintain intimate human relationships, and the right to associate for the purpose of engaging in activities 
protected by the First Amendment.  The court has declared that 
 
According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in 
preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression 
by the majority … implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment 
(is) a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.78 
 
The United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) has specifically held that the First Amendment protects the 
right of members of a motorcycle gang to associate with one another and with the club.79  It has been held that 
guilt by association alone, without establishing that an individual’s association poses the threat feared by the 
government, is an unacceptable basis on which to deny First Amendment rights.  The government must show a 
knowing affiliation with an organisation with unlawful aims and a specific intent to further such aims.80 
In the leading case of Boy Scouts of America v Dale,81 the Court clarified that the association concerned in 
such cases must show that it engages in ‘expressive association’ in order to have a First Amendment argument.  
This expressive association can be in private or publicly.82  It is not necessary that the association occurs for the 
purpose of disseminating a certain message,83 nor that every member of a group agree on every issue.  The 
requirement of expressive association is satisfied by something as simple as a mission statement for the 
organisation wherein a wish to instil values in young people is expressed.84 
 
4.0   Less Drastic Means Doctrine 
 
Another relevant factor in considering these laws is whether other means are available to achieve the ends to 
which the legislation apparently aspire that are less intrusive of fundamental rights.  There is some support for this 
doctrine in the Australian and American case law.  A unanimous court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation seemed to accept the validity of such an approach, in the current context: 
In ACTV for example, a majority of this Court held that a law seriously impeding discussion during the 
course of a federal election was invalid because there were other less drastic means by which the objectives of the 
law could be achieved.85 
Logic might suggest that in examining whether laws are ‘appropriate and adapted’ with respect to a 
particular power or to pursue legitimate ends, the question of the availability of less intrusive means, where the 
law does impact rights and freedoms, is relevant.  Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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Rights, by recognising that the right to freedom of association but accepting it is not absolute, also calls for such a 
proportionality consideration by allowing laws infringing upon freedom of association if they are necessary.86  
So, for example, in arguing against the proscription regime in the South Australian legislation, it can be 
argued, as Joseph has argued in relation to the anti-terrorism proscription laws, that  
 
the exclusion of substantive judicial involvement from the proscription process may also deprive 
Australia’s proscription measures of the proportionality needed to comply with Article 22 of the 
ICCPR.  Indeed, there seems to be no reason why proscription could not take place on the basis 
of a judicial declaration sought by the Attorney-General.87 
 
In relation to the South Australian legislation, it might also be asked why it is necessary to provide for 
control orders, which have the effect of prohibiting a person who is a member of a declared organisation from 
owning particular weapons when weapons regulations already directly provides rules in terms of eligibility to 
possess weapons.  Why is it necessary to provide, as the New South Wales legislation does, that members of 
declared organisations then lose their right to carry out particular occupations that require a licence?  It is expected 
that anyone wishing to obtain or renew such a licence would already be subject to particular rules and 
requirements in relation to behaviour, lack of criminal behaviour etc.  The need to connect eligibility to engage in 
such activities to non-membership of a particular group has not been established.  To the extent that groups are 
involved in criminal activity, where is the evidence that current laws regarding drugs, money laundering, proceeds 
of crime legislation and criminal conspiracy are not sufficient to tackle the ends to which this legislation is said to 
be aimed? 
 
5.0   Conclusion 
 
These legislative developments involve a very substantial interference with fundamental human rights.  The South 
Australian legislation is offensive to well-established principles of due process, natural justice, freedom of 
association, and the separation of powers.  The New South Wales provisions impact substantially on freedom of 
association, although the procedures the Act adopts are fairer and less likely to infringe the due process 
requirement.  The justification for such intrusions has not been shown.  Courts must uphold fundamental 
democratic principles in the face of such populist measures, even in the absence of an express bill of rights in 
Australia. 
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